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Abstract
Thousands of safety issues have been collected on-line at the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) as part of the Issue Management Plan.  However, there has
been no established approach to prioritize collected and future issues.  The authors developed a
methodology, based on hazards assessment, to identify and risk rank over 5000 safety issues
collected at INEEL.  This approach required that it was easily applied and understandable for site
adaptation and commensurate with the Integrated Safety Plan. High-risk issues were investigated
and mitigative/preventive measures were suggested and ranked based on a cost-benefit scheme to
provide risk-informed safety measures.
This methodology was consistent with other integrated safety management goals and tasks
providing a site-wide risk informed decision tool to reduce hazardous conditions and focus
resources on high-risk safety issues.  As part of the issue management plan, this methodology was
incorporated at the issue collection level and training was provided to management to better
familiarize decision-makers with concepts of safety and risk.
This prioritization methodology and issue dissemination procedure will be discussed.  Results of
issue prioritization and training efforts will be summarized.  Difficulties and advantages of the
process will be reported.  Development and incorporation of this process into INEELs lessons
learned reporting and the site-wide integrated safety management program will be shown with an
emphasis on establishing self reliance and ownership of safety issues.
Introduction
The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) has established safety
as a primary concern in its current and future work.  In attempting to modify the workforce
behavior to consciously care for personal safety and the safety of co-workers, several programs
have been administered under the umbrella of the Integrated Safety Management (ISM) program.
One of these programs is the Issue Management program that focuses on the collection and
resolution of problems associated with unsafe conditions at the INEEL.
Unsafe conditions or concerns are reported into the ICARE system as issues by anyone providing
work services to the laboratory.  The ICARE system is maintained by an on-line computer based
issue tracking and entering Intranet system available through standard worker access routes.
These unsafe conditions or concerns reflect procedures, administrative controls, physical hazards,
improper or inadequate safety barriers, or other issues that may result in a decrease in safety and,
therefore, an increase in the risk of some adverse consequence to the site.
The nature of the issues collected was wide ranging due to the flexibility of the ICARE system
and job diversity performed at INEEL.  Although the collection of issues in the ICARE system
was successful with more than 5000 records reported, the dissemination of issues based on the
significance of each issue was non-standardized.  This paper describes the methodology created
to standardize the resolution and priority of issues and their significance based on a risk-informed
approach.  This methodology establishes the framework for the corrective actions and lessons
learned program implementation.
Risk-Informed Methodology Development
Approach Requirements:  Early in the issue dissemination process, it was recognized that all
issues entered in the ICARE system had different levels of significance and that importance of an
issue could be interpreted in various ways.  The need for standardizing the prioritization process
was evident.  In addition, the results of this process needed to support and mold the corrective
actions and lesson learned tasks slated to follow the dissemination process.  Lastly, the approach
needed to lend itself to some measurement of site safety performance, for current and predictive
indicators of safety.
A risk-informed approach was suggested and adapted for the Issues Management program,
because it could accomplish prioritization of issues and provide the basis for specific
management strategies and technologies to increase safety.  This methodology was consistent and
paralleled the approach of the hazard assessment task being performed by the ISM initiative.
Issue Dissemination Process:  The methodology developed to disseminate issues through a risk-
informed prioritization and ranking scheme was adapted from military standards (ref. 1) and
modified to more closely parallel hazard assessments performed at the INEEL (refs. 2-3).
Dissemination of issues are accomplished by identifying potential hazardous conditions of the
issues, causes of those conditions, the potential effects and consequences, the associated risk with
the issues, and suggested mitigative measures to reduce high risk issues to a more reasonable
level.  This methodology supports the issue management objective of checking and tracking that
system safety questions are considered, addressed, and resolved in a efficient manner.
Issue dissemination was accomplished using a systematic approach to identify hazardous
conditions, causes, and consequences, risk, and mitigation.  The general approach consisted of
eleven steps:
1. Issue familiarization
2. Informal task analysis
3. Hazard identification
4. Scenario development
5. Cause identification
6. Consequence development
7. Preliminary Risk Assessment Code assignment
8. Identification of corrective measures
9. Final Risk Assessment Code assignment
10. Cost-benefit determination of corrective measures for high risk issues
11. Selection of cost-effective measures
These steps and the information collected during the dissemination process were collected and
entered into a database.  Each step is described in more detail below.
System Familiarization: Written information, such as concepts, specifications, drawings,
procedures, and processes were collected.  Issue analysts then discussed operations plant
personnel directly involved in the issue, if required.
Informal Task Analysis: Task analysis involves the identification of tasks to be performed and
component aspects of those tasks, such as who performs the task, what equipment/tools are
needed, what are the controls and displays used, and what information is required as input and
output of the system.  For each issue, an informal task analysis was performed to identify required
tasks and how the tasks would be performed.
Hazard Condition Identification:  The informal task analysis was used as the basis for hazardous
condition identification.  These tasks were reviewed for six possible consequences affecting
personnel, members of the public, the environment, environmental compliance,  mission success,
or public perception of the INEEL.  Since looking at all potential hazards is a Herculean task, a
generic hazard list was used to support this step.  This generic list, as seen in Appendix A, was
developed to reflect operational and situational hazards associated with the INEEL and may not
be exhaustive for use in other facilities or operations.
Scenario Development:  Scenario development reflects and documents an analyst’s thought
process in identifying the mechanisms in which the hazardous condition results in the specified
consequence.  The scenario includes the steps (in series) required for the outcome suggested, the
likelihood of each step, and identifies any safety barriers in place that may partially mitigate the
scenario.  Scenario development and review is essential for issue dissemination justification and
review.
Cause Identification:  Cause identification is often an outcome of the scenario development.
Causes, which could result in specific hazardous conditions, were identified.  Each hazard
condition may have multiple causes.  For example, a storage container may come loose in transit
because the securing strap broke (an equipment failure) or, an operator incorrectly secured the
strap (a human action).  The hazard causes focused on equipment failure, human actions, design
inadequacies, or administrative controls (e.g., procedure errors or deficiencies).  More detailed
causes were identified if appropriate (e.g., equipment failure due to design).  Although analysts
attempted to identify the root cause of the hazard, often only the proximate cause, the obvious or
immediate reason the hazardous condition has occurred, was known.
Consequence Identification:  Consequences predicted from hazardous conditions were identified
during this step in the PHA process.  Hazardous conditions may cause multiple consequences.
For example, following incorrect procedures using a piece of equipment may cause personnel
injury as well as damage to the equipment.  A dependency investigation was also initiated if the
scenario development provided evidence that other systems or facilities affected (or that affect)
by the hazard under consideration.  Understanding the systems or facilities effected by a
hazardous condition, aids in identifying a complete list of consequence areas to include in the
dissemination of an issue.
There are six consequence areas that have been identified that cover INEEL safety and business
concerns.  They include: 1) injury to one or more members of the public, 2) personnel injury, 3)
regulatory non-compliance, 4) mission interruption, 5) environmental damage, and 6) public
perception.
Preliminary Risk Assessment Code (RAC):  A preliminary RAC was assigned to each
consequence resulting from a hazardous condition.  These were based on the traditional definition
of risk as a combination of frequency (of the hazardous condition leading to the specified
consequence) and severity (of the consequence).  Decisions for assigning a RAC for associated
consequences were supported by the six risk matrices seen in Appendix B.  The RACs were
reviewed by a team of analysts for consistency.
Identification of Mitigative/Corrective Measures:  High risk hazards (Category 1 or 2) were
identified and scoped for measures that could reduce the risk of the hazard.  The developed
scenario provided understanding of the sequence of events that needed to occur for the hazardous
condition to lead to the specified consequence.  Only measures that reduced either the severity or
the frequency of the RAC were considered.
Final RAC Assignment: Preliminary RACs were then reevaluated based on the associated
corrective measures.  Final RACs were modified by a reduction in severity and/or frequency of
the consequence.
Cost-benefit Determination of Corrective Measures for High-Risk Issues:  Each corrective
measure was then analyzed for the effectiveness of the measure and the estimated cost to
implement the measure.  The effectiveness of the measure is an indication of the reduction of the
RAC.  The estimated cost of the measure is determined by historical site data estimates.
Selection of Cost/Effective Measures:  Lastly, the most cost effective measures, based on the
cost-benefit evaluation, are identified and suggested as potential improvement processes.  This
information will be used in site performance indicators to determine how successful this approach
is in estimating and implementing corrective measures and reducing site risk to an acceptable
level.
Information for these steps were entered into a hazard worksheet and then transferred to a hazards
database.
Risk Matrices:  The separation of consequences into six categories presented an interesting
challenge in the issue dissemination process.  The issue management team required a means of
easily and understandably describing the consequence categories for reviewers and management
less familiar with risk and hazard assessment techniques.  In addition, these qualitative/semi-
quantitative methods needed to reflect corporate and the Department of Energy (DOE) concerns.
This approach deviates from some previous methods developed (Reference 4) and does not
attempt to equate the significance of issues between consequences (e.g., two minor injuries is
equivalent to a moderate public relations problem).  Each consequence category is evaluated
separately and on its own merit.
Communication of the risk matrices required a means of easily understanding and classifying an
issue.  This was accomplished by development of six (five by four) risk matrices that clearly
show the frequency and the severity levels for each consequence category.  These matrices can be
seen in Appendix B and additional information on how these matrices are used can be found in
Reference 5.
Results of Issue Prioritization
At the time this paper was written, the issue dissemination task was not finished.  Issues that were
considered to be significant were researched first to support site safety concerns.  This included
approximately 270 issues, which were identified as significant by a corrective action review
board (CARB), prior to the issue management methodology development and review by the
hazard analysis team.  Therefore it should be noted that the subset of issues discussed in this
section were biased toward higher-risk issues.  Summaries of the results are presented below.
Each issue may result in risks in one or more consequence category.  Therefore, the number of
issues and the total number of counts across categories are not equal.  Issues that contained high
risk in any of the consequence categories were reevaluated as a risk-significant issue.
Risk Assessment Category Results:  There were 18 issues that had a RAC of 1, which means that
the issue posses an unacceptable level of risk and requires immediate corrective actions.  Of these
issues, all were considered high risk due to a personnel injury, mission interruption, or regulatory
non-compliance concern.  The majority (16) of issues fell into the personnel injury consequence
category.  Of these, 5 issues also had a RAC 1in another consequence area.
RAC 1 issues were diverse and included mostly site-wide process deficiencies.  9 issues focused
on lock out tag out, one issue on fall protection, two issues on tank substances, fire suppression,
and specific job hazards concerns.  Material receipts inspection and radiological material
classification concerns account for issues in the regulatory non-compliance consequence
category.
80 issues were determined to be in the RAC 2 bin.  These are issues that are undesirable and at a
reduced priority level, but still require corrective actions to be taken.  The remaining issues were
designated as RAC 3 or RAC 4.
The following pie chart represents the RAC breakdown for the 270 issues that were originally
identified as significant.  The number of significant issues originally determined to be a
significant concern were decreased by 63% when evaluated in a risk context.  However, it should
be noted that of the 4000 or so records not evaluated it is anticipated that some would fall into the
risk significant category.
Figure 1- Breakdown of Significant Issues By Risk Assessment Code
Difficulties and Advantages of the process:  The process of using a risk-informed approach to
improve site safety, although not new in theory, was new in practice.  The most difficult portion
of the issue dissemination process was introducing a risk-informed approach to INEEL members
not used to working in this new paradigm.  The transition was made easier by groups of
individuals at the INEEL well versed in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) push
toward risk-informed analyses.
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Scenario development and use of the risk-informed approach in performance indicators were
perhaps the more difficult concepts to communicate.  Original worksheets were reanalyzed to
accommodate the appropriate scenarios.  It was obvious from some procedures that some were
cross cutting and affected the entire site, while others were very specific and reflected specific
facility deficiencies.  The database had to be modified to identify these type of considerations.
Once these obstacles were overcome, the processing of the 270 significant events became much
easier.
The next step in the issue management process is to use the information collected in issue
dissemination to support a comprehensive and self-checking performance indicator program.
Performance indicators, derived from the issue management hazards database, were more
difficult to communicate to management.  In fact, educating management that the end use of the
issue dissemination process is not the prioritization of issues, but rather a comprehensive
performance check and balance process has not been entirely successful to date.
Performance Indicators
The objective of performance indicators is to ascertain how well INEEL is improving safety
associated with the issue resolution process.  In order to accomplish this objective, a simplified
model of the general site risk reduction process from the ISM program has been developed.  Next,
metrics have been established to support programmatic decisions at each step in the process.
The approach for establishing performance indicator metrics for the ISM risk-reduction process
focuses on four steps to provide a comprehensive picture of site/facility risk.  These steps include:
1) establishing a baseline of performance; 2) grading the current risk state of the site/facility; 3)
monitoring the issue resolution and subsequent effectiveness of the hazard improvement process;
and, 4) developing and verifying predictive risk trends.  The information to support each of these
steps, except step one, will be available through the ISM hazard assessment database.  These
steps are depicted in Figure 3 and the supporting metrics are described in more detail in the
following paragraphs.
Performance Indicator Metrics: There are six drafted performance indicator metrics that support
the ISM risk-reduction process outlined in the previous paragraph.  Three of these metrics are
profiles that describe past (Operational Performance History Profile), present (Current
Site/Facility Risk Profile), and predicted (Predicted Risk profile) risk by consequence category to
the site or specific facilities.  One qualitative metric (Improvement Process) provides insights into
managing site/facility risk and two metrics measure the progress of corrective actions (Degree of
Progress) and the effectiveness of the corrective actions and model accuracy.  Each metric is
described in the following paragraphs.
Operational Performance History Profile:  The operational performance history profile is used to
help benchmark and validate other portions of, and progress within, the Risk Reduction Process.
The operational performance history profile is based on a collation of objective indicators
specifically the number of: environmental violations, occurrence reports; and, Price Andersen
Amendment Act (PAAA) reports.  These values are collated, sorted, trended, and analyzed
monthly for an empirical determination of the operational performance history.  Additional data
sources may be included in this analysis as they are identified or developed. This metric is then
analyzed from a risk perspective to help establish and validate the current site/facility risk profile.
Figure 2 – Issues Resolution Process
Current Site/Facility Risk Profile:  In order to formula risk-informed decisions in the Risk
Reduction Process and assess the level of risk reduction attained, the Current Risk Profile must be
established.  Risk assessment codes (RAC), which are based on hazard assessment process within
ISM, are developed, to provide the unmitigated risk indices that comprise the Current Risk
Profile.  These preliminary RAC totals are broken down by consequence category, organization,
and facility.  This Current Risk Profile iu validated by comparison with the Operation
Performance History on a quarterly basis, and can be updated, as future operational performance
trends become apparent.
Predicted Risk Profile:  The Predicted Risk Profile defines the level of site/facility risk that is
predicted if specific improvements, which are often described in terms of safety barriers, are
implemented.  The Current Risk Profile is used as a basis for obtaining a more desirable
(theoretical) risk profile.  Similar to the Current Risk Profile, the Predicted Risk Profile is broken
down by consequence category, organization, and facility.  Differences between the current and
predicted risk profiles performance indicators establish a measure of residual risk.
Improvement Process:  The Improvement Process mentioned here is not a metric, but rather a
method of providing information to aid in structuring the associated process in the ISM program.
This information is extracted through the development of the predicted risk profile from the
Figure 3: Example of the Risk Reduction Progress Metric
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current risk profile.  The Improvement Process will be heavily dependent upon causal factors
collected as part of the ISM process.  High priority hazards (i.e., those hazards that contribute the
greatest risk) or cross cutting causal trends would get special emphasis in developing strategies
for the Improvement Process.  This would identify the most efficient pathways for attaining the
reduction of risk indicated by the Predicted Risk Profile.
Degree of Progress:  Once implementation of the Improvement Process begins, it will be
desirable to routinely assess the degree of progress toward reaching the level of risk reduction
indicated by the Predicted Risk Profile.  The most direct indicators for gauging the degree of
progress within the Improvement Process, are measures of implementation (or non-
implementation) of corrective action plans and the individual corrective actions.  These corrective
actions and plans are assumed to mitigate the root cause of past issues and therefore, affect future
issues stemming from a similar cause.  This, in turn, would reduce overall site/facility risk and
prevent future safety problems.  Measurement of the proportions of overdue corrective actions
and plans is considered the most immediate indicator of the degree of completion of the
Improvement Process.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions and Hazard Assessment Accuracy:  The independence of the
operational historical data provides a means of benchmarking the current risk profile and
establishing a connection between the effectiveness of the corrective actions and the accuracy of
the hazard assessment.  Measurement of the effectiveness of corrective actions and plans is
accomplished by gauging the proximity of the risk of operational data relative to the of the
Predicted Risk Profile (after a time step when the predicted risk profile becomes current) attained
by the Improvement Process.  This can best be ascertained by assessing the trends indicated by
the routine updates to the operational performance profile.  If this assessment indicates a
significant difference between the estimated degree of progress towards the Predicted Risk
Profile, deficiencies in the implemented corrective actions or inaccuracies in the Predicted Risk
Profile are indicated.  This assessment will be performed on a quarterly basis.
Conclusions
Development of a risk-ranking scheme for the INEEL was a challenging, but important step in
supporting a risk informed safety culture.  The growing influence and importance of safety at the
national laboratories demands methods that can prioritize operational issues and establish
guidelines for safe performance. Although this approach is new in theory it has not been formally
accepted at the INEEL until recently.
The most significant preliminary results show that when using a risk-informed approach the
number of significant events have been reduced by 65 percent.  Obviously, there are substantial
cost savings from not performing unnecessary corrective actions.  Additional cost savings may be
realized by applying corrective actions that target high-risk causes, as opposed to establishing a
general corrective action program that may not be effective for some hazard scenarios.
There have been some difficulties in implementing this risk-informed approach.  Although the
overall impression of this scheme is positive, training was required for the analysts performing
the ranking and prioritization of issues.  Management also required assistance in understanding
and implementing a risk-informed approach.  Implementing the performance indicators will
require a greater effort since it has been met with early confusion and is a more complex item.
However, the authors believe that this approach will be successfully refined and implemented at
the INEEL and would like to encourage other institutions toward a similar approach.
Appendix A: General Hazards List
I. Chemical Sources
Biological Agents
Construction
Corrosive Materials
Flammable Gases
Flammable Materials
Long-term Storage (decomposition)
Pesticide use
Radioactive Materials
Reactive Liquids
Volatile Flammable Liquids
Reactive Materials: Alkali metal & Corrosives
Oxygen Deficiency
Other
Material Handling Dangers
Material Transportation
Carcinogenic Materials
Low Visibility
Reactive Gases
Toxic Materials
Explosive materials
Pathogenic material (virus or bacteria)
General Hazardous Waste Materials
II. Cold Sources
Ice
Cryogenic materials
Other
Temperature extremes (low temp during activities)
Construction
III. Electrical Sources
Capacitors
Other High-Voltage Sources
Transformers
Static Electricity
Batteries
Exposed conductors
High Voltage (> 600 v)
Low Voltage (< 600 v)
Exposed Cables
IV. Environmental Sources
High Noise Levels
Construction
Excavation (unbreathable air)
Other
Inert and Low-Oxygen Atmospheres
Confined Space
V. Gravity Mass Sources
Construction
Excavation (cave-in)
Material Handling Dangers
Structural or Natural Phenomena
Other
Working at Heights
Slips, Trips, and Falls
VI. Heat Sources
Fire
Electrical
Chemical Reaction
Steam
Construction
Excavation (excessive heat from equipment)
Explosion
Friction
High Temperature
Material Transportation
Solar
Spontaneous Combustion
Temperature Extremes (during activities)
Other
Fire and Explosion
Hot Water
VII. Motion Sources
Belts
Excavation (heavy equipment)
Gears
Mass in Motion
Pinch Points
Construction
Material Handling Dangers
VIII. Administrative Programs
Operating Conditions
Program Deficiency
Regulatory Deficiency
Appendix B: Risk Assessment Category Risk Matrices
Table 1 - Risk Assessment Categorization for Site Personnel Injury
Hazard
Likelihood
Category
(annualized)
Consequence Severity Category for Site Personnel Safety
(Adverse health effects to a worker)
I
Catastrophic
(One or more deaths
of a site worker
II
Critical
(Severe injuries or
severe occupational
illness, or permanent
injury)
III
Marginal
(Minor Injuries or
minor occupational
illnesses requiring
medical attention)
IV
Negligible
(minor injuries not
requiring medical
attention)
A—Frequent * 1 1 2 3
B—Probable * 1 1 2 3
C—Occasional * 1 2 3 4
D—Remote * 2 2 3 4
E—Improbable
*
3 3 4 4
Table 2 - Risk Assessment Categorization for Public Injury
Hazard Likelihood
Category
(annualized)
Consequence Severity Category for Public Injury
(Adverse health effects to a member of the public)
I
Catastrophic
(One or more deaths
of a member of the
public
II
Critical
(Severe injuries or
severe occupational
illness, or permanent
injury)
III
Marginal
(Minor Injuries or
minor occupational
illnesses requiring
medical attention)
IV
Negligible
(Minor injuries not
requiring medical
attention)
A—Frequent * 1 1 2 3
B—Probable * 1 1 2 3
C—Occasional * 1 2 3 4
D—Remote * 2 2 3 4
E—Improbable * 3 3 4 4
Table 3 - Risk Assessment Categorization for Environmental Damage
Hazard Likelihood
Category
(annualized)
Consequence Severity Category for Environmental Damage
(Adverse health effects to the environment)
I
Catastrophic
(Severe acute or
long-term damage to
the ecosystem or
environment)
II
Critical
(Loss of a majority
of individuals within
a species, or major
disruption to the
wild life in a
localized area)
III
Marginal
(Damage to a small
number of
individuals in an
population that
results in a minor
consequence to
localized or regional
ecosystems)
IV
Negligible
(minor acute effects
on individuals in a
population  and
ecosystem)
A—Frequent * 1 2 3 4
B—Probable * 1 2 4 4
C—Occasional * 1 2 4 4
D—Remote * 2 3 4 4
E—Improbable 3 4 4 4
Table 4 -  Risk Assessment Categorization for Mission Interruption
Hazard Likelihood
Category
(annualized)
Consequence Severity Category for Mission Interruption
(Conditions that effect mission unavailability)
I
Catastrophic
(Loss of investment,
production, or
opportunity to
increase productivity
greater than 5M/yr)
II
Critical
(Loss of investment,
production, or
opportunity to
increase productivity
between 1 and
5M/yr)
III
Marginal
(Loss of investment,
production, or
opportunity to
increase productivity
between 10,000 and
1M/yr)
IV
Negligible
(Loss of investment,
production, or
opportunity to
increase productivity
less than 10,000/yr
A—Frequent * 1 1 2 3
B—Probable * 1 1 2 3
C—Occasional * 1 2 3 4
D—Remote * 2 3 3 4
E—Improbable * 3 4 4 4
Table 5.  Risk Assessment Categorization for Regulatory Noncompliance
Hazard Likelihood
Category
(annualized)
Consequence Severity Category for Regulatory Noncompliance
(Conditions that effect regulatory compliance penalties)
I
Catastrophic
(Noncompliance
with laws that result
in penalties greater
than 100k)
II
Critical
(Noncompliance
with laws that result
in penalties between
10k and 100k)
III
Marginal
(Noncompliance
with laws that result
in less than 10k in
penalties)
IV
Negligible
(Noncompliance
with laws that result
in no significant
penalties
A—Frequent * 1 1 2 2
B—Probable * 1 1 2 3
C—Occasional * 2 2 3 4
D—Remote * 2 3 3 4
E—Improbable * 3 4 4 4
Table 6 - Risk Assessment Categorization for Public Perception
Hazard Likelihood
Category
(annualized)
Consequence Severity Category for Public Perception
(Reduction of public confidence about INEEL)
I
Catastrophic
(A condition or
incident that causes
national or
international concern
or attention)
II
Critical
(A condition or
incident that causes
state or regional
concern or attention)
III
Marginal
(A condition or
incident that causes
local county or city
concern or attention)
IV
Negligible
(A condition or
incident that causes
individual concern
or attention)
A—Frequent * 1 1 2 3
B—Probable * 1 2 3 4
C—Occasional * 2 2 3 4
D—Remote * 3 3 4 4
E—Improbable * 4 4 4 4
*A—Frequent (Consequences that occur one or more times a year) B—Probable (Consequences that
are expected to occur .1 but less than 1 time annually)C—Occasional (Consequences that occur 0.01 but
less than .1 times a year) D—Remote (Consequences that occur 0.001 to 0.01 times a year) E—
Improbable (Consequences that occur below 0.001 times a year)
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